

3
AN
APPENDIX

TO THE

OBSERVATIONS

IN DEFENCE OF

THE LIBERTY OF MAN,

AS

A MORAL AGENT;

IN ANSWER TO

Joseph
DR. PRIESTLEY'S ILLUSTRATIONS

OF

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY:

OCCASIONED BY

THE DR.'S. LETTER TO THE AUTHOR.

By JOHN PALMER,

MINISTER OF NEW BROAD-STREET.

Printed for J. JOHNSON, No. 72, St. Paul's Church-yard,

M.DCC.LXXX.

[Price SIX-PENCE.]

APR 11 1964

010174 143410

MAILED 1951

APR 19 1964

2.10. ТАЛАНТЛИК ҲАТТЭЛИК ...

УЧЕБНИК И РАБОЧАЯ ТЕТРАДЬ

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО

Page 10

ADVERTISEMENT.

AFTER giving a close attention to Dr. Priestley's Letter, I cannot think it necessary to enter into any fuller discussion of its contents, than what is contained in the following remarks. In them, those parts of the Letter, which were deemed most material, are noticed. I have not, as far as I know, passed over any thing of the argumentative kind, which seemed to require a reply; and as to every thing else, I have aimed to be as concise, as was at all consistent with a proper vindication of myself; desirous to render the whole as useful, and as little offensive, as possible.

JOHN PALMER,

ADVERTISEMENT.

AFTER giving a close attention to Dr. Priestley's Letter, I cannot think it necessary to enter into any farther discussion of its contents, than what is contained in the following remarks. In them, those parts of the Letter, which were deemed most material, are noticed. I have not, as far as I know, touched over any thing of the nature of a mistake, which seemed to require a notice, and as to every thing else, I have endeavored to be as concise, as was at all consistent with a proper vindication of myself, and anxious to render the whole as useful, and as little offensive, as possible.

JOHN PALMER.

REMARKS

ON

DR. PRIESTLEY'S LETTER.

I CANNOT avoid just noticing the surprise, which the Dr. expresses in several parts of his Letter*, that I had not attended more to what he had said, on some points of the controversy, in the *Correspondence*. It might have prevented the Dr's wonder, had he recollected, that I had said in the Preface, p. 6. "The following Observations were
" nearly finished before the publication of
" the Correspondence between Dr. Price,
" and Dr. Priestley; though I have since
" given that performance a careful perusal."
The fact is as exactly as I have there stated
a it:

* See Pages 8, 22, 24, &c.

it: not, (as Dr. Priestley, by a most unaccountable mistake, supposes me to have said or intimated) that my publication was “composed more than a year ago;” that is, from the date of his Letter, which is August 1779*; but the composition was nearly finished before the Correspondence was published, which was not till December 1778; nor, as I have above suggested, did I read the correspondence, till after I had finished the Observations, which was towards the end of January 1779. My reason for deferring the perusal of that performance was, that I supposed the leading arguments in favour of necessity were contained in the *Illustrations*; and that, as my first design was so nearly executed, it would be best to compleat it, before I entered into the consideration of what had passed in the *Correspondence*: though, at the same time, I determined to submit it to the judgment of some learned friends, whether, after the publication of the *Correspondence*, that of the *Observations* was not unnecessary.

Considering the declaration in my preface,
before

* See Letter, Page 2.

before cited, I cannot but think it a little extraordinary, that the Dr. should say, as he does p. 22. of his Letter, referring to what I had observed on certainty and necessity: " Now, this is a case that I had considered
" so fully in my late Treatise, in my Cor-
" respondence with Dr. Price, and in my
" letters to Dr. Horsley and Mr. Berington,
" that I did not think I should have heard
" any more of it; and yet it seems you have
" read part, at least, of what I have advanced
" on that subject." I have only to reply, that it would have been strange indeed, if I had not read somewhat which the Dr. had written on a subject, about which I presumed to reply to him. But need I assure him, that what I had read was in the Illustrations; the other pieces, to which he here refers, I had not then read. I must also take the liberty to add, that now I have read them, they appear as little satisfactory as the former: and that to all, which Dr. Priestley has advanced on this part of the argument, in the Correspondence, Dr. Price appears to have given a very clear and sufficient reply.

Dr. Priestley, in p. 3, of his Letter, speaks

A P P E N D I X.

of the consequences of the doctrine of necessity, as if they did not affect the real merits of the question. "I shall, says the Dr. "confine myself chiefly to the discussion of "those points, on which the real *merits of* "the question turn, without replying at large "to what you have advanced, with respect "to the *consequences* of the doctrine. Indeed, if the doctrine itself be true, we "must take all the genuine consequences, "whether we relish them or not." I must here observe, that the proof of liberty is far from being wholly rested on the consequences of not admitting it. But if those consequences will clearly and directly follow from necessity, which are subversive of such plain and important principles, as are intimately connected with the moral and accountable nature of man, and with the moral character and government of God; these consequences must operate very forcibly, as proofs of the falshood of the necessarian doctrine. "We "must, *no doubt*, take all the genuine consequences, whether we relish them or "not, if the doctrine itself be true." But consequences, of the kind just mentioned, seem

seem greatly to outweigh all speculative reasonings, of every sort, which can be thought of; and incontestably to prove, that the doctrine, which such consequences attend, is not, and cannot be, true. They are also consequences, implying in them ideas so abhorrent to my reason and feelings, and, in short, to every principle in my mind; as must cause me not barely to disapprove, but to reject, with the utmost detestation, the doctrine from which they follow.

In thus arguing from consequences, I have done no more than adopt an usual, and what has been generally deemed, a just mode of reasoning. Dr. Watts, in his celebrated Treatise on Logick, or the Right Use of Reason, Edit. vii. p. 335. in a note, remarks, “ It is a very common and useful
“ way of arguing to refute a false propo-
“ sition, by shewing what evident falsehood
“ or absurdity will follow from it: for what
“ proposition soever is really absurd and
“ false, does really prove that principle to
“ be false, from which it is derived.”

I must further remind Dr. Priestley, that the mode of reasoning from consequences,

A P P E N D I X.

which he seems, at times, so much to dislike, is the very mode, which he himself has made great use of, and to which he is indebted for some of his principal arguments in defence of Philosophical Necessity. Does not the Dr. take great pains to prove, that if the mind be moved, not as necessity, but as liberty teaches, *it would follow*, that the volitions, or actions of men, are effects, which exist without any proper cause to produce them? Does he not also lay the utmost stress on the denial of the Divine Prescience, as the *immediate and necessary consequence* of holding the doctrine of liberty? It is only in the same way of reasoning, that I have endeavoured to support the doctrine of liberty: and with no other difference that I can see, than that the consequences depending are much more interesting, and those arising from the denial of it so peculiarly dangerous.

Page 23. The Dr. says, “ You have indeed been able to collect, which was not difficult, (for I had occasion to repeat it several times) that in favour of the *necessary* determination of the mind according to

“ to motives, I have urged the *certainty* and
 “ *universality* of such a determination ; but
 “ I wonder you should not likewise have
 “ observed, that, in farther support of this,
 “ I added, that *certainty or universality is*
 “ *the only possible ground of concluding, that*
 “ *there is a necessity in any case whatever ;*
 “ and to this, which you have not so much
 “ as noticed, you ought principally to have
 “ replied.”

Inattentive as the Dr. thinks I have been,
 to the position which he here recites from his
 Illustrations; I was so far from overlooking
 it, that I regarded it as the basis, on which
 his argument for the necessary determination
 of the mind rested : nor could his reasoning,
 in favour of such a determination, carry the
 least appearance of propriety in it, but on
 the supposition, that the idea of *necessity* did,
 in all cases, immediately arise out of the *cer-*
tainty or universality of the effect produced ;
 or, in the Dr's own words, that this “ is
 “ *the only possible ground of concluding, that*
 “ *there is a necessity in any case whatever.*”
 I must therefore still consider myself, in all
 that I have insisted on, to establish the
 distinction

distinction between *physical and moral necessity*, as really replying to this very argument, which the Dr. says, “*I have not so much as noticed.*” The reader will judge, whether I have noticed it or not, from what is contained in the fortieth and nine following pages, of the Observations, which I must beg leave to recommend to his careful attention. I have only to add this one general remark, that, whereas Dr. Priestley makes *certainty* or *universality* to be the ground of his idea of necessity (and which, notwithstanding his seeming allowance, in some places, of a distinction in the kinds of it, appears, upon examination, to be uniformly the same, amounting to that *necessity* which is *physical* or *absolute*) I cannot, on the other hand, but consider the *certainty*, both *natural and moral*, as arising out of the different ideas of necessity, which I have endeavoured to explain and support; and, in consequence of this, I am led to think, that the certainty is as different as the different causes or occasions of it: and which of these is the most natural and reasonable method of deduction, I must likewise submit to the judgment of those, who will be at the pains to examine what

We

we have respectively offered on the subject.

Page 27. The Dr. says, " I hope to satisfy you, that even all that you describe as most horrid and frightful in the doctrine of *necessity*, follows as evidently from your doctrine of *certainty*, provided it be a real certainty, though not such as you would chuse to call a *physical* one; and therefore that it can be nothing more than the mere name that you object to."

My reply is briefly this—*Certainty is a real certainty*, though it be only a *moral* one; and yet it is not a *physical* one. The difference is as great, as between my being persuaded, excited, moved, influenced, by any arguments or motives, to do a thing; and my being impelled to do it, so as that it was out of my power *not* to do it. In a word, where *moral certainty* only takes place, the power of agency still remains; whereas, by that, which is *physical*, it is entirely destroyed. To suppose the existence of the one, in the latter sense, is virtually, and to all intents and purposes, to contradict and deny the existence of the other.

- Page 28, &c. The Dr. introduces the following case, which, that it may be fully understood, I will recite in the Dr's own words—" We will suppose that a child of
" yours has committed an offence, to which
" his mind was *certainly*, though not necessarily determined by motives. He was
" not made, we will say, in such a manner
" as that motives had a *necessary* effect upon
" his mind, and *physically* or *mechanically* determined his actions, but only that his
" mind would in all cases *determine itself*,
" according to the same motives. You hear
" of the offence, and prepare for instant correction, not, however, on the idea that
" punishment is justifiable whenever it will
" reform the offender, or prevent the offences of others, but simply on your own
" idea, of its having been in the power of
" the moral agent to act otherwise than he
" had done."

" Your son, aware of your principles,
" says, dear father, you ought not to be
" angry with, or punish me, when you knew
" that I could not help doing as I have done.
" You placed the apples within my reach,
" and

“ and knew that my fondness for them was
“ irresistible. No, you reply, that is not a
“ just state of the case, you were not under
“ any *necessity* to take them, you were only
“ so constituted as that you *certainly* would
“ take them. But, says your son, what am
“ I the better for this freedom from neces-
“ sity? I wish I had been *necessarily* deter-
“ mined, for then you would not punish
“ me; whereas now that I only *certainly*
“ determine myself, I find that I offend just
“ as much, and you always correct me for
“ it.”

“ A man must be peculiarly constituted,
“ if, upon this poor distinction, he could
“ satisfy himself with punishing his son in
“ the one case, and not in the other. The
“ offence he clearly foresaw would take
“ place: for by the hypothesis, it was ac-
“ knowledged to be *certain*, arising from his
“ disposition and motives; and yet merely
“ because he will not term it *necessarily*, he
“ thinks him a proper object of punishment.
“ Besides, please to consider whether, if the
“ child never *did* refrain from the offence, in
“ those circumstances, there be any reason
to

“to think that he properly *could* have re-
frained.”

The above case carries some appearance of novelty, but is as extraordinary as it is new. It involves in it many questions, and is too generally stated, to admit a particular discussion. All I can reply to it must be in general, and it is briefly this—Supposing the child to possess intelligence and liberty, both which I must consider as essential to moral agency, and consequently to responsibility; and I will then not scruple to say, that disobedience to his father's orders, in taking the apples, which were forbidden, renders him, in a degree, culpable and deserving punishment—In what degree he is so? and what allowances candour should lead the father to make for the trespass?—These are other and different questions, the solution of which must depend on a variety of circumstances; such as—the abilities and temper of the child—his situation at the time—the degree of his fondness for apples—the nature of the prohibition—the manner in which it was urged and supported—and the like—All which, it is readily allowed, must have
some

Some and a certain influence, so as materially to affect the degree of criminality, with which the child stood chargeable: but however those circumstances be settled, he must, after all can be supposed in his favour, be deserving some blame, unless his fondness for the apples was really *irresistible*, so that he had it not in his power to refuse them. This I take to be the precise point on which the criminality depends: and if the offending child should, therefore, be such an adept in the art of self-defence, as to reply, “What
“ am I the better for this freedom from
“ necessity? I wish I had been necessarily
“ determined, for then you would not punish
“ me; whereas now, that I only certainly
“ determine myself, I find that I offend just
“ as much, and you always correct me for
“ it.”—The answer to be returned him is a plain and convincing one, and it is this—That you are not the better for your freedom is owing to your not using it—Don’t you, my son, see a vast difference between determining yourself, call it *certainly*, if you please, and being *necessarily* determined by something else?

else? Nay, I appeal to yourself, whether you are not conscious that you had it in your power not to have taken the apples? I should hardly think that any boy of common understanding, if he attended, would call this answer, or the distinction on which it is founded, a poor one.

Dr. Priestley asks, “ if the child never “ *did* refrain in these circumstances, there “ be any reason to think that he properly “ *could* ?”

My answer is, *all* that appears to me to follow, from a child's never having refrained, is not that there was no reason to think he ~~could~~, but merely that he would.

I have only further to remark on this case, that the Dr. misrepresents me, when he intimates, p. 28. that I have no idea of punishment, as justifiable “ whenever it will re-
“ form the offender, or prevent the offences
“ of others ; but simply,” on what he calls my “ own idea, of its having been in the
“ power of the moral agent to act otherwise
“ than he had done.” I must here refer to Section 7, of the Observations, where, on a careful revision, I still think it plain, that I
am

am not speaking of the ends of punishment, but the foundation of it in the moral character of the objects of it.—Had the Dr. considered this, he would have spared his remark.

Notwithstanding all that the Dr. has said, to urge the pursuit of the controversy about prescience; I am so far satisfied with what I have advanced on that subject, in the Observations, as to leave the argument in the state, in which I have there placed it. I cannot, however, forbear adverting a little to the charge of “seeming *levity*, in treating “this most serious of all subjects,” which the Dr. produces against me; and with which he owns, he “cannot help being extremely “shocked.” See the Letter, page 44.

In answer to this formidable accusation, I must observe, that it is in the parody I have given on the Dr's satirical invective against Dr. Beattie, where alone I can find any thing, in that part of the argument, which is capable of being construed into a “seeming *levity*: and if any thing, which I have there said, appears to the Dr. to merit that charge, I must then beg leave to ask him,

him, what ought to be his opinion of his own original, which I have so carefully endeavoured to copy after? If there is any reason for his being “extremely shocked” with my *levity*, how much greater cause has he to be shocked with his own, in setting before me so inviting a specimen, which I have done no more than imitate; and this too, with no other view, than to form an appeal to the Dr’s feelings, for the utter impropriety of any such manner of writing?

Page 55. The Dr. makes a remark which I own I could little have expected from him. —I had represented the necessarian doctrine as having a tendency “to relax the mind, “and sink it into a state of indolence and “inactivity:” On which the Dr. observes, “Here then you reduce the Necessarian to a “state of absolute inactivity, that is, indisposed to any *pursuits*, virtuous or vicious, “For your argument, if it goes to any thing, “goes to both alike.” —Can this be deemed a just or fair construction of the terms *indolence* and *inactivity*? When I had said in the preceding part of the same argument, and in the very page before, “If we judge of “mankind

“ mankind at large by what we see of them,
“ the disposition which they too commonly
“ discover, to find apologies for neglecting
“ the business and duties of life, and exceed-
“ ing in their indulgencies and pleasures,
“ cannot but lead us to suppose, that they
“ would avail themselves of such a senti-
“ timent, as the doctrine of necessity pro-
“ poses to their belief, to be still more neg-
“ ligent as to every important concern, and
“ to allow themselves much greater freedom
“ in every gratification, to which sense and
“ appetite prompt them.” Was not such a
previous explanation of my design sufficient
to clear me from the imputation, of having
“ reduced the Necessarian to a state of abso-
“ lute inactivity, that is, indisposed to any
“ pursuits, virtuous or vicious?”

I had clearly expressed my meaning to be,
not that the necessarian believer was in dan-
ger of becoming wholly stupid and motion-
less, but that his belief tended to indispose
him for virtuous activity and self-command.
This, it was plain, was the only activity
which I meant to exclude, as the effect of
such a belief; having all along supposed him

to be active enough in gratifying his irregular and vicious inclinations. Having hinted this; I shall not notice any of the Dr's reasonings, and lively turns, on a supposed oversight of mine; but which are all so evidently founded on a palpable mistake and misrepresentation of his own.

One of my arguments, the Dr. tells me, p. 73. of his Letter, he "really cannot treat with so much seriousness," as he supposes I shall "probably expect."

I had said, in the Observations, that, according to the scheme of necessity, "every thing that takes place in my body, as well as my mind, may with equal propriety be called my act or volition; and so the circulation of the blood, and the pulsation of the heart, may with equal reason be called my volitions."

Here the Dr. asks, with an air of triumph, "Now, Sir, is not judgment always called an *act of the mind*, as well as volition? But has any man power over this? Is not this necessarily determined by the view of arguments, &c.? You will not deny it." To this I answer; I will not, indeed, nor will

will any one, deny, that judgment is, in common speech, called an *act of the mind*, as well as volition : but I shall most certainly deny, 'that judgment and volition are always understood to express *acts of the mind*, in the same, that is, a *philosophical* sense. The Dr. must surely have forgot that I had said, in the Observations, p. 53. " The judgment is in its own nature passive ;" or he would not here have thought of my allowing judgment to be equally an act with volition. But he has himself furnished me with an answer to his first question, that is, " Is not judgment always called an act of the mind, as well as volition ?" By the two before recited, which immediately follow it ; namely, " Has any man power over this ? Is not this necessarily determined by the view of arguments ?" It is granted to the Dr. that man has no power over *judgment*, meaning by that the last act of it ; and that it is so determined, as he intimates.— And what is the conclusion ? Is it not, that, in this respect, being passive ; it cannot, in a proper sense, be *active*, or an *act* ? How is

this conclusion to be avoided, unless to *act*, and to be *acted upon*, mean one and the same thing? When the Dr. has proved *that*, he may then with some reason suppose himself to have also proved, as he here thinks he has done, on my principles, “ that whatever “ passes in *my* body, as well as in *my* mind, “ may with equal propriety be called an act “ of *my* judgment; and so *that* the circula- “ tion of the blood, and the pulsation of “ the heart, may with equal reason be called “ my judgment.”—Till then the Dr’s ergo, *that* judgments and volitions are the same things, will be plain only to a believer in necessity—And it is he only who can be affected by the paradoxical conclusion, which the Dr. subjoins.——On which I shall only add, that when he has proved *judgment* to be an *act*, he will then have set before the world a fair specimen of a method of proving contradictions; and will find it not a whit more difficult to prove to mankind, that their “ heads” are their “ feet,” and their “ feet” their “ heads,” or that they have no heads at all. But to return to the argument; I wish the Dr. to reconsider the

the

the nature of the position, which he has represented as so very futile and ridiculous. It was, in substance, only this, "that if I had
" no power over my own *volitions*, the term
" (*volitions*) was no more applicable to what
" passes in my mind, than to any thing
" which takes place in my bodily frame."
And what has the Dr. done to invalidate this reasoning? He has taken it for granted, that I admit that to be an *act*, which is really, and which I maintain to be, a mere passive effect. The principle therefore which he has adopted, as the medium of proof for all his conclusions, is denied: and what then must become of the conclusions themselves?

In all I have said, *judgment* still remains to be *judgment*, and *volition* is *volition*; or, in other words, according to my ideas of them, they are principles in the mental frame essentially different in their nature, the one active and the other passive: whereas, according to the Dr. they are both of the same general kind, that is, they are both really passive, or alike necessary in their operations; whatever verbal distinction he may choose to make between them.

Dr. Priestley, p. 77. recommends a close attention to the “real *phænomena of human nature*,” as the only unexceptionable method of settling the debate concerning the agency of man. This is no other than the same rule of *philosophizing*, which the Dr. so frequently and strenuously insists on, in his Illustrations: and to what I have said in the course of the Observations, I must refer for an answer. I shall only add here, that if the “*phænomena of human nature*,” are to determine the question, we must certainly include the whole of the “*phænomena*,” one of which is, that, let the actions be ever so “*definite in definite circumstances*,” they are still conscious of having had it in their power to determine otherwise than they actually did. This seems incontrovertible, from what they feel, in consequence of those volitions, or actions, which are of a moral nature. This reply, I am aware, can have no weight with the Dr: because he considers all these feelings as founded on a deception; a real, though a natural and necessary, deception. I must therefore be content with looking on the answer, which I have now given, as satisfactory

atisfactory to myself; nor do I apprehend, that I herein materially, if at all, differ from Dr. Price, as Dr. Priestley supposes I do.

Dr. Price does not, as far as I can recollect, any where say or intimate, that the volitions or actions of men are so definite in any circumstances, as that they are necessarily determined by the circumstances: but only considers the circumstances in the light of motives or reasons of action, to which the agent has respect in the determinations he forms, while he yet determines himself, on the view of them. And the frequent, or even constant similar determinations of men, in any given circumstances, only render it morally certain, that is, probable, and this in proportion to the frequency of the prior volitions, that he will form the same again. Dr. Priestley has also very much mistaken Dr. Price, when he represents him, which he does, p. 78. of the Letter, as “admitting that the self-determining power is wanted only, when the motives are equal.” Dr. Price has, indeed, in the Correspondence, put a case, in which he makes such a supposition, that is, that the motives are, in fact,
b 4 equal:

equal : but this I understand Dr. Price to have proposed only as one instance, in which Dr. Priestley himself must see, and be obliged to acknowledge, that without such a power, as the advocates for liberty maintain, no determination at all could be formed: while he yet held the necessity of it, in all cases whatever, to constitute proper agency; and that, in all our actions, it is *wanted* and used.

Dr. Priestley has further equally mistaken me, when he says, p. 78. that I “generally
 “suppose the mind capable of acting contra-
 “ry to any motive whatever,” by which the Dr. has, a little after in the same paragraph, explained himself to mean, acting “with-
 “out, or contrary to motives.”—Answer—
 I never said, or supposed, that a rational being can act without any motive, good or bad. But the most, I ever said, was, “that in
 “the very same circumstances, in which *the*
 “choice or determination *of the mind* was
 “directed to one object of pursuit, it might
 “have brought itself to will or determine on
 “the pursuit of a different and contrary
 “one.” See the Observations on the state of
 the

the question, p. 17. So that still the volition or determination would have some ground or reason for it; though that would have been as different, as the determination which was grounded upon it.

Dr. Priestley pursuing his idea of the “unalterable chain of *situations* and volitions.” See the Letter, p. 77. comes at last, in p. 79, to this conclusion, “that there can be no more than one proper agent in the universe.” On this I cannot avoid remarking, that, in the Dr’s way of reasoning, it seems impossible there should be any one. Volition with him necessarily depends on motives, or situations, that is, on something independent of itself, as the cause: and if this be true, it must hold universally, which will directly exclude, together with the idea of self-motion, that of a first mover. And if, on the other hand, one self-mover be admitted, I see nothing to hinder, why there may not be millions of self-movers; unless the communication of the power could be proved to be a contradiction and impossibility.

Dr. Priestley, treating on “the prejudice,
“dice,

“ dice, arising from the terms machine and
“ necessity,” says, p. 83. “ You mislead and
“ deceive yourself, I am persuaded, not a
“ little, by the frequent use of the oppro-
“ brious term *machine*, saying, in the first
“ place, that, because a man wills *necessarily*,
“ that is, definitely in definite circumstances,
“ he wills *mechanically*; and then having
“ made a man into a *machine*, you, un-
“ known to yourself, connect with it
“ every thing opprobrious and degrading
“ belonging to a common clock, or a ful-
“ ling-mill.”

My only reply shall be—That I made no more nor less of man, than the Dr. has described him to be. I did not suppose him to be either “ a clock or a fulling-mill,” any more than a wind-mill or a hobby horse. But notwithstanding all the Dr’s ingenious refinements on the mechanism of the human frame, I must still regard the necessarian notion of man, as amounting to nothing more or better than that of a *machine*; and I will not scruple to add, on the principle of necessity, man appears to be the most inconsistent and inexplicable of all machines.—

For

For a just and striking picture of man, in that state of degradation, to which materiality and necessity have reduced him; I shall beg leave to recite the description given of him by Dr. Price, in the Correspondence, p. 355, in the following words; “ If Dr. Priestley is right, my soul is literally the offspring of the earth;—a composition of dust; incapable of all agency; a piece of machinery moved by mechanical springs, and chained to the foot of fate; all whose powers of thought, imagination, reflection, volition, and reason, are no more than a *result* from the arrangement and play of a set of atoms, all unthinking and senseless. —What can be more humiliating than this account?—How low does it bring the dignity of man?—I cannot help feeling myself degraded by it unspeakably.—Were it to be received universally, it would, I am afraid, operate like a dead weight on the creation, breaking every aspiring effort, and producing universal abjectness.”

Page 88. Dr. Priestley says, “ The origin of action, in your sense of the word, that is, the origin of self-determination, is the
“ same

“ same as the origin of the Deity, concerning which we know nothing at all.”

It is common with philosophers to speak of the origin of created beings, but to speak of “ the origin of the Deity,” that is, of an eternal, uncreated Being, seems to be a new mode of expression, and peculiar to the Dr.—What origin could there be to a Being, who is unoriginated, or eternal? As such is his nature, it is no wonder that “ we know “ nothing” concerning his “ origin:” but thus much we know, concerning his power of volition and action, as well as concerning his existence, that they are both uncaused and eternal, that is, cannot possibly have any origin at all.

The Dr. further asks, same page,—“ How “ can you think it any degradation to the “ Deity, that he should *act* necessarily, “ when you allow that he *exists* necessarily? “ And again—Is not the *existence* of any “ being or thing, of as much importance to “ him, as his acting?

I shall only reply to these questions, by proposing the following ones.—Is not necessary, that is, eternal existence, the highest possible

possible idea of existence which can be formed?—And can that be a degradation, which implies in it the most absolute perfection of existence?—But if by “*acting necessarily*” the Dr. means, any way of acting incompatible with the idea of self-motion, or perfect agency; I would then again ask—Is there any comparison to be made, between “*acting necessarily*,” or, in other words, being acted upon, and being perfectly free in all his volitions and actions?—I confess, for my own part, I cannot perceive the least similarity between the two things, which the Dr. seems here to consider as so nearly resembling one another.

Dr. Priestley, pages 92, 93, of his Letter, expresses himself in the following remarkable manner.—“ I really think it (the doctrine of necessity) “ the clearest of all “ questions, the truth of it being as indubitable as that the three angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles, or that *two* and *two* make *four*, and “ therefore I have no feeling either of *fear* “ or *arrogance*, in challenging the whole “ world in the defence of it. This argument

• A P P E N D I X.

“ ment I compare to such ground as one
 “ man may defend against an army. It is,
 “ therefore, absolutely indifferent to me by
 “ *whom*, or by *how many*, I be assailed. You
 “ would, probably, say the same with respect
 “ to the doctrine of liberty, at least the style,
 “ in which your book is written, seems to
 “ speak as much.”

Probable as the Dr. may think it, that I would express myself in the same manner on the side of liberty, as he has done in the above passage, in favour of necessity; in this I am clear, that it would be a mode of expression very unbecoming me: and notwithstanding the strength of those convictions on the subject, which I really possess, and which I have expressed in many parts of the Observations, and the confidence with which the Dr. has charged me; I would still hope, that the stile of the Observations does appear to the generality of its readers, to be very different from that of the paragraph which I have recited from the Dr's. Letter; and not to render it at all probable that I would allow myself in any such manner of writing, respecting the point of liberty, or any other controverted

controverted point whatever.—Will the Dr. also excuse me, if I take the freedom of entering into a little candid expostulation on the great impropriety of such modes of expression in themselves?—Whatever the Dr. might say, or insinuate, of some of the defenders of liberty, whom he thought by no means equal to the task they had undertaken; let him not deem me arrogant in asking, whether it might not have been expected, that the reverence due to such authors as a Locke, Wollaston, Clark, Foster, and Price, should have put some restraint on his pen? If the question about necessity was, as the Dr. says, “the clearest of all questions,” and so demonstrable, and even self-evident, as he makes it to be; will not the direct consequence be (for here again I must hint at consequences) will not, I say, the direct consequence be, that all those great authors, whose names I have mentioned, and very many others, which might be added to them, were either so very short-sighted, as to remain in all the darkness of the grossest ignorance, respecting the clearest of “all questions;” or else were so blinded by prejudice,

dice, as to controvert even a truth no less
 “ indubitable” than any which are capable
 of strict demonstration, or discernible by im-
 mediate intuition,—If the Dr. had here
 “ paused” a little, as he says, p. 94, the in-
 stances we every day see of “ confirmed
 “ judgments in things of the greatest, as
 “ well as of the least moment, ought to
 “ make the most confident of us” to do;
 though he might have remained equally and
 “ necessarily determined by his own view of
 “ the evidence before him;” I think I may
 yet venture to say, that the mode of expres-
 sing his convictions would have been confi-
 derably lowered, so as, at once, to have ren-
 dered it better adapted to the object of his
 zeal, and more consistent with the respect
 which he himself must allow to be due to
 not a few, who are of the contrary persuasion.

Clear, however, as the evidence for the
 truth of the necessarian doctrine lies before
 the Dr’s mind; his hopes of success, in pro-
 pagating it, are as moderate, as his declara-
 tions in its favour are strong.

“ Notwithstanding, says the Dr. p. 96,
 “ all that I shall ever be able to write in
 “ favour

“favour of the doctrine of necessity, your
“supposed *consciousness of liberty*, and other
“popular arguments (though when analysed,
“they really make against your hypothesis)
“will always secure *nine* out of *ten* of the
“generality of our readers.”

Not to enter into any further debate about the analysis of the arguments I have insisted on; I cannot help expressing my wishes, that the “*consciousness of liberty*,” or any other arguments, might secure not only *nine* out of *ten*, but, if it were possible, even the *tenth man* too, from the reception of so ensnaring a doctrine, as that of necessity: but I will not, at the same time, conceal my apprehensions, that, though it be indeed, as Dr. Price justly calls it, “a deadly potion,” it must yet be so very grateful to those who want to find a plea for their vices, that the generality, who are unfortunate enough to get a taste of it, will be too ready to swallow its worst dregs; and that, having so done, they will be so far overcome by them, as to be confirmed in the practice of many vices, though they may not proceed to that outrage and violence, which the Dr. mentions: and even

against those greater enormities, I cannot consider necessarianism, but principles and feelings of a very different nature, as their security.

I cannot conclude these remarks without expressing a little wonder, that Dr. Priestley should have given himself the trouble of writing ninety seven pages in reply to the "Observations;" when he says, p. 97, "I see nothing *new* in any thing that you have advanced."

I never, indeed, made pretensions to the discovery of any of the great principles, on which the doctrine of liberty stands; and was clearly of opinion, long before the Correspondence was published, that all the arguments, which were of importance, on both sides of the question, had been ably discussed by other writers. Dr. Price, also, with his usual liberality of mind, observes, in a note to his additional Observations in the Correspondence, p. 51. "It is, indeed, with some pain I reflect, that much of this discussion is little more than a repetition of Mr. Collins's objections on one side, and Dr. Clarke's replies on the other." The
want

want of novelty; therefore, in the principles of the Observations is not peculiar to that performance: and was it requisite to the utility of any publication, that the ideas should be so entirely new, as to be different from any thing which had been before advanced; Dr. Priestley must admit, that the number of such publications, as were fit to appear, would be very, very small. The application, however, which I have made of the principles of liberty, in reply to Dr. Priestley, I hope I may be permitted to consider as my own, whatever may be thought of my reasonings.

Whether there is that “ appearance of “ *arrogance*” in the tone of the Dr’s Letter, which he supposes, p. 90, I shall “ probably think there is;” I will join issue with him in referring to the decision of indifferent persons. I think it, however, proper to say for myself, that, having, in the best manner I was able, stated my views of the leading arguments both on the side of liberty and necessity; I now decline a controversy, which, I am persuaded, it can answer

swer no good end to continue: and shall, therefore, hold myself excused, in being entirely silent, should "circumstances determine" the Dr. to take any public notice of what is subjoined in this Appendix, or to advance any thing more on the subject.

F I N I S.